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How much should a defender spend on defense and how should it allocate those resources 
across the sites it is trying to protect? This paper analyzes a model in which a defender first has 
to decide how much to spend on defense and what to spend it on. The more that a defender 
devotes to protecting a specific site, the less likely an attack on that site is to succeed and, 
crucially, the lower the marginal return to investing in attacking that site. After the defender 
moves, the attacker decides how much effort to devote to attacking each site. Three key 
conclusions result: First, the questions of how much to spend and what to spend it on are 
“separable.” However much the defender decides to spend, it should allocate those resources in 
the same general way. Second, a very simple principle or algorithm determines the optimal 
allocation. The defender minmaxes the attacker’s marginal gains, i.e., allocates its resources in 
the way that minimizes the attacker’s maximum marginal gain from exerting additional effort. 
Third, the defender is in effect a Stackelberg leader. The optimal level of spending takes into 
account how the defender’s allocation affects the attacker’s effort and generally is that level of 
spending which equates the marginal benefits of additional spending with the marginal cost of 
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 HOW MUCH AND ON WHAT? 
 
 
Two factors make the problem of defending against terrorists especially daunting. First, as the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security emphasizes, “terrorists are strategic actors” (White 
House 2002, 7). No one believes that hardening the levies around New Orleans affects the 
probability that another hurricane like Katrina will strike New Orleans again or Miami rather 
than New Orleans.  But strategic actors do try to strike where the defense is weak and the 
expected gains are high. Protecting one site may shift the risk of attack to another. “Increasing 
the security of a particular type of target, such as aircraft or buildings, makes it more likely that 
terrorists will seek a different target. Increasing countermeasures to a particular terrorist tactic, 
such as hijacking, makes it more likely that terrorists will favor a different tactic” (White House 
2002, 29). 
Second, relative to the large number of potential targets, resources are scarce. We cannot 
defend everything. As Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff assessed 
the sitution shortly after taking office, “Although we have substantial resources to provide 
security, these resources are not unlimited. Therefore, as a nation, we must make tough choices 
about how to invest finite human and financial capital to attain the optimal state of preparedness” 
(2005b). Echoing the 9/11 Commission, Secretary Chertoff has emphasized throughout his tenure 
that these scarce resources should be allocated on the basis of risk. “Risk management must 
guide our decision making as we examine how we can best organize to prevent, respond and 
recover from an attack” (2005a).  
   This paper offers a game-theoretic framework for analyzing two related questions. How 
much should a defender spend on defending against a strategic attacker, i.e., a terrorist group, 
instead of devoting those resources to other social ends like health care or education? Second, 
how should a defender allocate however much it decides to spend among the multiple sites it is 
trying to protect?  
In the model, a defender first has to decide how much to spend on defense and what to 
spend it on. The more that a defender devotes to protecting a specific site, the less likely an 
attack on that site is to succeed and, crucially, the lower the marginal return to investing in 
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attacking that site. After the defender moves, the attacker decides how much effort to devote to 
attacking each site. In order to focus on the fundamental ideas, insights, and intuitions, we 
simplify matters by assuming that all of the sites the defender is trying to protect are identical. 
But the results generalize to a setting in which some or all of the sites differ from others.  
Three key conclusions follow from the analysis. First, the questions of how much to 
spend and what to spend it on are “separable.” However much the defender decides to spend, it 
should allocate those resources in the same general way. 
Second, a very simple principle or algorithm determines the optimal allocation. Suppose 
that the defender has decided to spend a specific amount on defense but has not yet allocated it. 
Given this null allocation, a strategic attacker will direct its efforts to the site offering the highest 
marginal return on that effort. The defender therefore should invest in hardening this site and 
reducing the attacker’s expected return from trying to attack it. The more the defender spends on 
this site, the less vulnerable it becomes and the lower the expected return to an attack. 
Eventually, this site will be no more attractive than what was initially the second most attractive 
site. That is, both offer the same marginal return on the attacker’s effort to strike them. At this 
point, the defender must invest in protecting both sites so the neither is more attractive than the 
other. The more the defender spends on these two sites, the lower their vulnerability and the less 
attractive targets they become. At some point, these sites are no more attractive than what was 
originally the third most attractive site. From here on the defender must invest in guarding all 
three sites so that that no one site is any more attractive than the other two. The defender 
continues to allocate its resources in this way by spending so as to make the most attractive 
profile as unattractive as possible. In brief, the defender minmaxes the attacker’s marginal gains, 
i.e., allocates its resources in the way that minimizes the attacker’s maximum marginal gain from 
exerting additional effort. 
The third conclusion is that the defender is in effect a Stackelberg leader. The optimal 
level of spending takes into account how the defender’s allocation affects the attacker’s effort 
and generally is that level of spending which equates the marginal benefits of additional 
spending with the marginal cost of diverting these resources from other social ends. In principle, 
the defender may be able to spend enough to induce the attacker to exert zero effort in carrying 
out an attack. But this may require such a high level of defense spending that it is not optimal. 
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   The next section presents the game-theoretic model. It also links the basic components 
of the model to the critical elements of risk management, consequence, vulnerability, and threat. 
The subsequent section characterizes the defender’s optimal level of spending and the attacker’s 
optimal level of effort. There follows a discussion of the comparative statics describing how the 
optimal levels of spending and effort change as the underlying parameters change. The last 
section discusses the generality of the results and an appendix sketches a game-theoretic analysis 




    A defender has N identical sites to protect and must decide how to much to spend on 
defending them and how to distribute those resources across the sites it is trying to guard. The 
more the defender dedicates to a given site, the “harder” that site becomes and the less likely an 
attack on that site is to succeed. After observing the defender's allocation, an attacker decides 
how much effort to devote to attacking each site. The more effort the attacker devotes to striking 
a specific site, the more likely the attack on that site is to succeed.  
A strategy for the defender in this game simply specifies how much the defender spends 
on each site. In symbols, it is an allocation 1( ,..., )Nr r r=  where is the amount allocated to 





R r==∑ . Analogously, the attacker’s 
strategy specifies how much effort it will put into attacking each site after observing any possible 
allocation r. More precisely, a strategy for the attacker is a function 1) ( ( ),..., ( ))Ne r e r(e r =  where 
 is the effort the attacker puts into striking site j. ( ) 0je r ≥
    Let 0λ >  denote the loss the defender suffers if a site is successfully attacked. If the attack 
fails, the defender’s loss is zero. (We assume for simplicity that an attack either succeeds or 
fails.) The attacker gains of 0γ >  if a site is successfully attacked and zero if the attack fails. 
The more the defender spends on a site, the less likely an attack on that site is to succeed. 
Formally, let be the probability that an attack on site j succeeds if the defender spends 
on hardening that site and the attacker expends effort  on hitting that site.  is 
increasing in  and decreasing in . 
( , )j j jV r e
jv
jr je ( , )j j jV r e
je
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We now make an important assumption which greatly simplifies the analysis. The 
vulnerability of a site is multiplicatively separable in effort. That is, we can write the 
vulnerability  as where the function  depends solely on . The 
substantive significance of this assumption is that the marginal effect of additional effort on the 
vulnerability of a site is independent of the level of effort already being exerted. That is, 
 is independent of  or . Stating this assumption more formally: 




/jV e∂ ∂ j 02/j jV e∂ ∂ =
ASSUMPTION 1 (SEPARABILITY): The vulnerability of each site j can be written 
as . ( , ) ( )j j j j j jV r e v r e=
Assumption 1 is critical to the analysis. A second simplifying assumption makes the 
algebra easier but is not substantively critical. We assume the  is linear in resources, i.e., 
. If the defender devotes nothing to site j, then 
jv
jr( ) 1j j jv r vr= − 0= , , and an attack on 
this site is sure to succeed.  The parameter v measures the marginal effect that additional 
resources have on the vulnerability of a site. The larger v, the greater the effect of additional 
spending on the vulnerability of a site.
(0) 1jv =
1 
Spending on defense means diverting resources from other social ends. These costs are 
assumed to rise and at an increasing rate as R increases. More concretely, let take the cost to 
devoting R to defense to be  The parameter 2( )D Dc R k R= Dk  measures the social opportunity 
cost of spending on defense rather than some other social goal. The higher Dk , the more costly 
defense is relative to other social priorities and the faster these costs rise as R increases. 




E == e∑  denote the total effort expended 
on attacking. Then the cost of exerting this effort is assumed to be  where  
measures the relative difficulty the attacker has in exerting the effort needed to carry out an 
attack.  
2( ) / 2A Ac E k E= Ak
                                                 
 
1 We assume v is small enough that  over the substantive relevant range of resource 
allocations. 
( ) 0j jv r >
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In light of all of this, the defender’s expected loss if it allocates r and the attacker replies 





( , ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )N j j j DjL r e r v r e r c Rλ==∑
1
( ) ( ) ( )N j j j Aj v r e r c Eγ== +∑
+
( ,G r
The basic elements of this model broadly correspond to the three key components of risk-
management which are vulnerability, threat, and consequence. Vulnerability “is the probability 
that a particular attack will succeed against a particular target" (GAO 2005, 25), and this is what 
is in the model. Threat “is the probability that a specific target is attacked in a specific 
way” (Willis et. al. 2005, 8). In this formulation, the amount of effort the attacker puts into 
hitting a site serves as a proxy for the probability of an attack on that site. Finally, 
( )j jv r
λ  formalizes 
the defender’s “range of loss or damage that can be expected from a successful attack” (NIPP 
2006a, 41).2  
Note, however, that nothing in the risk-management framework corresponds to the cost 
of spending on defense rather than something else, i.e., nothing corresponds to  in the 
model. At its best, risk-management provides guidance on how one should allocate a fixed 
amount of resources. It says little or nothing about how to determine the optimal amount to 
spend on defense. 
( )Dc R
 
The Optimal Levels of Resources and Effort 
 
This section describes the intuitions underlying the equilibrium outcome. The appendix 
offers a more detailed game-theoretic discussion of the equilibrium. The fact that the sites are 
identical suggests the defender will distribute however much it decides to spend evenly across 
the N sites. In symbols, . This leaves the defender with losses of /jr R N=
[ ] [ ] [ ]1 11 / 1 / ( ) 1 / (N j D DjL vR N vR N e c R vR N E c Rλ λ λ== − = − + = − +∑( )N j Dj e c R= +∑ )




2 Strictly speaking, λ  is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility which is related to economic losses 
but is not the same thing. 
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attacker’s payoffs are [ ] [ ]1 1 / ( ) 1 / (N j A AjG vR N e c E vR N E c Eγ γ== − + = − −∑ ) . Note that the 
only choice left to determine is how much the defender spends and level of effort E. 
The defender will choose R partly based on the defender’s anticipation of how the 
attacker will react. To determine this, consider the attacker’s decision after seeing that the 
defender has allocated R to defense and spread these resources evenly across the N sites. The 
attacker chooses E to maximize its gain G given this allocation. Taking the derivative of G with 















⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
where recall .2( ) / 2A Ac E k E=
[
3 Thus, for any given allocation R, the attacker’s optimal level of 
effort is ]* /R N−( ) ( / ) 1AE R k vγ≡
[1 / ]vR N
. This level of effort equates the marginal gain from 
additional effort, γ − , with the marginal cost ( )Ac E k EA′ =  (see the second equality 
above). As expected, there is an inverse relation between the defender’s spending and the 
attacker’s effort. As R increases,  declines. *E ( )R
The function  describes how the attacker alters its level of effort in response to 
varying levels of defense spending. Anticipating that the attacker will respond in this way, the 
defender’s losses to R are 
*( )E R
[ ] *1 / ( ) (D )L vR N E R c Rλ= − + . The optimal allocation R minimizes 
these losses. To solve for this, differentiate L with respect to R to obtain: 
                                                 
 
3 This critical point is sure to maximize G since 2 2/ 0AG E k∂ ∂ = − < . 
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[ ] [ ]
*
*
cost effect of increasing defensive effect of increasing deterrent effect of increasing 
1 / ( )( )     1 /      ( )     D
RR R
vR NL E RE R vR N c R
R R R







The expressions on the right side of this equality offer a useful decomposition of the 
effects of an increase in defense spending into the defensive effect, the deterrent effect, and the 
cost effect. The first term, the defensive effect of an increase in R, is the effect that spending 
more on hardening the sites has on the defender’s expected losses given that the attacker’s level 
of effort remains the same. The second term might be thought of as the deterrent effect. This is 
the decrease in the defender’s losses resulting from the attacker’s decision to invest less effort in 
mounting an attack. Finally, the third term is the increase in losses due to the greater expenditure 
on defense. 
Substituting the expressions for  and  and then solving for the optimal 
allocation 
*( )E R ( )Rc R





v k k N
γλ
γλ= + . 








v k k N
γ
γλ= +  
 







v k k N
γλ
γλ= + . 
                                                 
 
4 This critical point is sure to minimize L since 2 2/ 0L R∂ ∂ > . 
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In sum, when the defender anticipates how the attacker responds to the defender’s actions, the 




How do the optimal level of spending and the defender’s losses vary with the parameters 
of the model? Suppose, for example, that the opportunity cost of spending on defense increases 
(i.e., Dk  goes up). This makes defense spending more costly and, intuitively, seems likely to 
result in lower spending and higher losses. Moreover, these higher losses will be due in part to 
the fact that the attacker will exert more effort to carrying out an attack. Formally, the effect of 




direct effect on losses from an indirect effect on losses from an
attack due to lower spending attack due to changes in effort
1 / (    1 /      D
D D D









cost effect of 









Inspection of the expression for *R  shows that the level of defense spending decreases as 
the cost of diverting those resources from other social purposes Dk  increases ( ). 
Hence the direct effect of an increase in 
* / 0DR k∂ ∂ <
Dk  is positive. Spending goes down, sites are not more 
vulnerable, and the defender’s losses from an attack rise.  
The same is true of the indirect effect. As Dk  increases, the defender’s spending 
decreases, and this induces the attacker to increase its effort . Finally, the cost effect by itself 
is ambiguous as a larger 
*E
Dk  makes any given level of spending more costly but the higher Dk  
also reduces the level of spending *R . Nevertheless, the first two effects swamp the potentially 
ambiguous third effect and the defender’s losses increase as Dk  increases (the expression for  




Similarly, the defender’s losses are increasing in (i) the losses λ  the defender suffers if a 
site is destroyed, (ii) the gains γ  the attacker gets from destroying a site (since this induces 
greater effort), and (iii) the number of sites N. Defense spending *R  is increasing in the gains γ  
and losses λ . It decreases as the costs  and Ak Dk  rise. Finally, the attacker’s effort is increasing 




The formal analysis has centered on a model in which the sites are identical. But many of 
the results generalize beyond this. The critical assumption is the separability assumption which 
recall is that the vulnerability of every site j can be written as ( , ) ( )j j j j j jV r e v r e= . As long as 
this holds, the results go through.5 More precisely, let jλ  and jγ  be the defender’s loss and the 
attacker’s gain if site j is successfully attacked. Then the results described above hold even if 
these losses and gains differ across the sites (i.e., jλ  need not equal kλ  and jγ  need not equal 
kγ ), the defender’s losses differ from the attackers gain (i.e., jλ  need not equal kγ ), and the 
functions relating vulnerability to resources, , differ from site to site.(jv r )j
6 
To outline the analysis in the more general case, recall that the marginal return the 
attacker obtains from investing effort in attacking site j is ( )j j jv rγ . Thus the attacker will only 
invest effort in attacking the sites offering the highest return on this investment, namely those 
sites k such that ( ) max{ ( )}k k k j j jv r v rγ γ= . Given that the marginal return to effort is 
max{ ( )}j j jv rγ , the attacker exerts the level of effort  that equates the marginal return on this **E
                                                 
 
0
5 Some mild technical assumptions are also needed. The loss function L is kinked and possibly 
discontinuous at finitely many value of R. The needed technical conditions ensure that 
 everywhere else. 2 2/L R∂ ∂ >
6 See Powell (2008) for an analysis of a more general game that allows each site to differ from 
the others. The attacker in Powell’s model chooses the probability of attacking rather that the 
level of effort. But the separability assumption ensures that these two formulations are 
essentially equivalent. 
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effort to the marginal cost, i.e., . It follows that if the defender decides to 
spend R on defense, it will allocate those resources so as to minimize the attacker’s maximum 
marginal return to effort. That is, the defender distributes R in the way that minimizes 
**max{ ( )} ( )j j j Av r c Eγ ′=
max{ ( )}j j jv rγ . The defender now chooses the allocation R that minimizes the defender’s losses 




The National Strategy for Homeland Security emphasizes that terrorists are strategic, and 
this poses at least two questions. When allocating scarce resources to defend against strategic 
attacker’s, how much should the defender spend on defense and how should it allocate those 
resources across the sites it is trying to protect? Strategic interaction often makes resource-
allocation problems extraordinarily difficult to analyze, but that turns out not to be the case here. 
Taking the effects of strategic interaction is relatively straightforward and yields three key 
findings. 
First, the defender’s level and allocation problems are separable. However much the 
defender decides to spend, it should allocate those resources in the same general way. Second, 
the defender should allocate however much it decides to spend so as to minmax the attacker’s 
return on its effort. Finally, the defender’s strategic position is analogous to that of a Stackelberg 
leader. Taking into account how the defender’s allocation will affect the attacker’s effort, the 
optimal level defense spending generally equates the marginal benefits of additional spending 




This appendix sketches a game-theoretic analysis of the model. A subgame perfect 
equilibrium is a strategy profile  such that (i) the effort allocation  maximizes the 
attacker’s payoff G r  for every resource allocation r, and 
(ii) the resource allocation  minimizes the defender’s loss 
 given that the attacker plays according to . 








2( , ( )) ( ) / 2j j Ae r e r k E⎡ ⎤ +⎣ ⎦∑
*r
1 ( )j jvr e rλ ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦1( , ( ))
N
j
L r e r ==∑ *( )e r
Solving the game by starting with the last decision and working up the game tree to the 
first decision, consider the attacker’s decision following any allocation r. It wants to choose  




1 /N j j Aj vr e k Eγ= ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦∑ 2 1N jjE == e∑ . The separability assumption 
plays a crucial role at this point. Given that the attacker’s marginal return to increasing je , i.e., 
[1 ]jvrγ − , is independent of , this maximization problem has a very simple solution.  je
The attacker will only invest effort in the site or sites offering the highest marginal return 
on that investment. That is, the attacker will only invest effort in going after k if 
[ ]1 max{ [1 ] : 1,..., }k jvr vr j Nγ γ− = − = . Let  denote the set of the sites offering the attacker 
it’s highest expected marginal return: 
( )T r
[ ]( ) 1 max{ [1 ] : 1,..., }}k jT r vr vr j Nγ γ= − = − =
0ie
{ :k . Then 
the attacker invests no effort in attacking sites outside T, i.e., =  for ( )i T r∉ . This implies 




































where the second line follows from the first because [ ]1 [1k jvr vrγ γ− = − ]  for all , ( )j k T r∈ .  
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Differentiating the previous expression with respect to E  yields shows that the optimal 
level of effort given allocation any r is where k is any element in . If 
there are two or more sites that offer the maximum return on the attacker’s effort, i.e., if  
contains two or more sites, the allocation  across the sites in  is arbitrary because the 
return on every allocation is the same. Since the attacker’s allocation across the sites in  is 
arbitrary, let  be the site in with the smallest index, that is, 
*( ) ( / )[1 ]AE r k vrγ= −
*( )E r





( )t r( )t r ( )T r min{ :j j T= ∈ , and 
suppose that the attacker allocates all of  to . *( )E r ( )t r
Turning to the defender’s strategy, the problem for the defender is to select the allocation 
 given the attacker’s strategy of allocating  to . Formally, the defender 
wants to choose  to minimize . This is equivalent to 
selecting the allocation r that solves . Because all of the 
sites are identical, the minmax allocation of R is to distribute R evenly across the N sites. That is, 
the optimal distribution of R is to set 
* * *
1( ,..., )Nr r r= *( )E r
( )E r




*r *( )( , *( )) 1 t rL r e r vrλ ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦
1,...,







= . This means that the defender’s losses reduce to 
. Differentiating with respect to R yields the optimal allocation 2)A N k+
)A D





2R vNγλ γλv= + k k N . 
In sum, the subgame perfect equilibrium allocation entails a level of spending *R  spread 
evenly across the N sites. The attacker’s total level of effort is 
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